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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the oil price formation for the purpose of understanding price reactions of OPEC member 
countries to changes in the exchange rate of the US dollar and prices of other members in the short run. The results 
suggested that there is a partial impact of exchange rates volatility on oil prices dynamics in short runs. Moreover, the 
study demonstrated that Saudi Arabia behaves as a leader in the OPEC structure market while it behaves differently 
when linked to other reference markets. Generally, Saudi Arabia behaves more potentially and more moderately than 
the other OPEC members in responding to change of references markets prices.
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1- Introduction 
 
For most countries, the real price of oil is dependent on two main factors: the value of the 
US dollar and the inflation rate. Since oil prices are contracted in US dollars and oil 
exporters import their goods from countries including the United States, a strong dollar 
will decrease the real oil price and a weak dollar will increase it (Melhem and Terraza, 
2008). A decline in the value of the dollar will weaken an oil exporter’s purchasing 
power  since  it  effectively  makes  imports  originating  outside  the  United  States  more 
expensive and should lead the oil to be cheaper outside US (Amezegar, 1986).  
 
Several  studies  have  empirically  examined  oil  exporters’  reactions  to  changes  in  the 
exchange rate by adjusting export prices and holding import prices steady in order to 
maintain market shares. The degrees of exchange rate pass through depend crucially on 
the  market  structure,  market  share
1…etc.  These  literatures  provide  evidence  that 
imperfect competition may be one major explanation for the existence of an incomplete 
exchange rate pass through. In an attempt to fill the existing gap in the literature, Knetter 
(1993), Yousefi and Wirjanto (2004, 2005)
2 used the exchange rate as a determinant 
element in the oil price formation and they showed that the export price mark-up implies 
a partial exchange rate pass through . Despite a voluminous study on this  subject, the 
question on whether and how mark -up adjustment in response to changes in exchange 
rates affects the import price, appears not to have been studies much  in the short run. 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the reactions of OPEC countries 
to change in the exchange rate and changes in the price of other members in short runs. 
 
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows.  A section 2 develops a model 
for the exchange rate pass through. Section 3 presents the empirical results and section 4 
concludes. 
 
2- The model 
 
In order to investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility on oil prices, we follow a 
model used in Yousefi-Wirjanto (2004), which is completed by a variance structure as 
specified  by  Froot  and  Stein  (1991)  to  compute  the  exchange  rate  volatility.  This 
modification permits us to highlight the impact of exchange rate on oil prices in the short 
run. 
 
Given that the depreciation of the US dollar is expected to attract the oil price inflows at 
least for the following two reasons: First, the volatility of the US dollar affects the oil 
price trend. Second, the depreciation of the US dollar impacts on the OPEC countries 
assets and weakens their purchasing power. Due to its “Flexibility and uncertainty” in 
nature, real exchange rate volatility is assumed to consist of two parts: one is a part 
                                                 
1 For an extensive studies on this subject, see Kurgman (1987), Durnbush (1987), Giovannini (1988), Froot 
and Klemperer (1989), Thusnelda (1996), and Also for a comprehensive survey of current studies on the 
exchange rate pass through, Menon (1995). 
2 For the oil market model; see Adelman (1982, 1993), Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991), Griffin and Teece 
(1982), Johany (1980). Adams and Marquez (1984) develop a simple cartel model for OPEC to explain 
optimal oil price determination.   2 
explained  by  the  failures  of  establishing  the  law  of  one  price  and  the  other  is  an 
unexplained part. In order to focus on the unexplained part of the real exchange rate of 
USD volatility,
us
t VOL , we define it as the deviation of the actual value from the value 
explained by the failure of the law of one price: 
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r a ˆ v is the volatility explained by the 







 represents the ratio of the domestic 
price in time t, t P , to the price in country i in that time. The large magnitude of 
us
t VOL  
means that other factors than the failure of the law of one price play an important role in 
the real exchange rate volatility. 
 
The empirical model proposed to explain prices dynamics is justified by equation (1). We 
assume that exchange rates variations affect the changes in the marginal cost and all 
export destinations prices. Therefore, changes in the exchange rate and in competitor’s 
prices  are  the  primary  explanatory  variables  of  the  destination-specific  best  response 
function: 
 
      t i t t i
us
t i i t i D P VOL P , ,                                         (2) 
 
Where Pi,t is the logarithm of crude price charged by the source nation i to the destination 
market, 
us
t VOL is the volatility of effective exchange rate of dollar, Pt is the logarithm of 
crude prices charged by the competitors. t i,  is the random error terms assumed to be i.i.d. 
) , 0 (
2
i   and  t D is a dummy variable set to 1 for 2008:07 - 2008:12 and 0 otherwise. 
 
The destination specific intercept term captures all non price determinant factors. The 
pricing to market can be judged from the sign and magnitude of the parameter estimate of 
β only. The slope coefficients as specified in the model are allowed to vary across export 
destination markets. Therefore, we confine our analysis in order to show the oil export 
price reaction to an exogenous change in exchange rates in the short run. 
 
A highlight of the importance of the two sources of prices changes is obtained through 
the interpretation of the sign and magnitude of the parameters    and .  is the export 
price markup parameter. When 1    exchange rates pass through does not take place 
because the individual producer adjusts its mark-up to absorb the full in the exchange rate 
to keep its export price constant. When 0    implies that changes in the exchange rate 
have no impact on the  price  charged by  the exporting nation. When  1 0     there   3 
would be a partial exchange rate pass through. That is, changes to the exchange rate 
affect the way in which crude prices are formed. In the case where  is negative, the 
individual producer adjusts its mark-up to absorb the full change in the exchange rate to 
keep its export price constant in terms of foreign currency. In the case    is positive the 
individual producer does not need to adjust its mark-up because they keep its purchasing 
power. That is, the profit margin remains unchanged and change in the exchange rate 
would be fully passed on to the importing nation, net of overall price changes. The value 
of   provides a clear indication of the relative size of each individual exporting nation. 
Therefore, the large value of  indicates, close to one, for a large market, while the value 
can indeed deviate from one for small market. 
 
The export price reaction to rival’s price is captured by the parameter estimate of   that 
measures the elasticity of the best response function of an individual exporting country. A 
positive sign of   implies that reactions are strategic complements, while a negative sign 
indicates a strategic substitution. The value of   provides a clear indication of the market 
power of each individual exporting nation. In particular, while one may expect a large 
value, possibly close to one, for a small exporting nation, such value can indeed deviate 
from one for a large exporting nation. 
 
 
3- Empirical results 
 
Before undertaking a statistical analysis that examines the reaction of spot prices for oil 
to the behaviour of the exchange rate, we shall describe the data using in this paper. The 
data we use are daily observations, over the first of January 1999 to end of Dec 2008, of 
the real index of the effective exchange rate of the dollar (EERD). The real index of the 
effective exchange rate is the price adjusted major currencies index of Dollar. The oil 
price series are the US dollar daily spot prices of West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil 
reference  (WTI),  North  Sea  Brent  reference  (Brent),  OPEC  basket  price  reference 
(OPEC), Iranian oil price reference (Iran light), the oil price of Venezuela reference (Tia 
Juana Light), the oil price of Saudi Arabia reference (Arab Light) and the oil price of 
Nigeria (Bonny Light) deflated by the US consumer price index. The variables are used 
in logarithmic form of first difference. The data employed are taken from the Federal 
Reserve’s,  European  Central  Bank,  OPEC  organization  and  Energy  Information 
Administration (EIA). 
 
We start our empirical examination with the unit root test by employing the augmented 
Dickey  Fuller  (1981)  tests.  The  results  are  presented  in  table  1.  We  use  Akaike’s 
information criterion to select the appropriate lag lengths. For all series, we are unable to 
reject the unit root null hypothesis and the series are stationary in first order differencing 
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Table 1 : Unit root test of ADF. 
                   
Stat-Test   WTI     Brent      OPEC       Iran       Venezuela         Saudi        Nigeria       EERD 
 
ADF     1.56     1.75       2.07        1.82           1.59        2               1.77         -1.37
 
    [0.00]
 *    [0.00]
 *     [0.00]
 *       [0.00]
 *          [0.00]
 *     [0.00]
 *          [0.00]
 *       [0.00]
 * 
ADF(-1)       -49.5    -53.1      -42.1         -47           -48.9                -48            -47            -48.3  
                [0.35]      [0.42]       [0.21]       [0.37]        [0.55]             [0.43]         [0.39]        [0.57] 
 





Table 2 reports the summary statistics of both oil series and exchange rates it shows 
significant difference between the standard deviations of the prices series of the WTI 
reference, Brent reference and those of OPEC basket (members of OPEC). We note a low 
variation of the OPEC member’s prices series (except Nigeria) compared to those of the 
WTI and Brent reference. Moreover, differences appeared amongst OPEC members, with 
low variations of South American members (Venezuela), high variations of the African 





Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
           Mean         Min           Max       SD       Skew                   Kurt 
              Level      Δ           Level      Δ         Level      Δ        Level      Δ           Level      Δ         Level      Δ 
 
WTI      39.9       0.0008      11.2     -0.2         94.6      0.18      18.3       0.02        0.7      -0.53       2.5       8.9             
Brent    38.2       0.0009      9.62     -0.12       92.5      0.12      18.5       0.02        0.8      -0.26       2.4       5.4 
Opec    35.9       0.001        8.09     -0.16        87.8     0.12      17.9       0.01        0.8      -0.33       2.6       15.1 
Iran     35.7       0.001        8.02     -0.16        89.4     0.11      17.9       0.02        0.9      -0.46       2.7        6.4 
Vnzla  33.7       0.0009       8.39     -0.19        86.8     0.09      16.2       0.02        0.9      -0.44       3.1       6.1 
Saudi  35.9      0.0009        9.15     -0.12        88.1     0.16      17.3       0.01        0.9      -0.13       2.7       7.3 
Ngria  38.8      0.001         9.23      -0.19        94.2    0.13      19.5        0.02        0.8      -0.48       2.5       7.2 
eerd    90.1     -0.001        68.0      -0.01        111.6   0.017    10.6        0.01        0.1       0.07      1.82      3.7 
  Δ= First difference of the logarithm 
 
In estimating Eq. (2), we take into account the possibility that changes in crude prices 
charged by competitive exporters are endogenous to changes in crude price charged by 
the source nation. This suggests that price variables may be correlated with the equation’s 
error term, sign of co-linearity problem between the variables. Table (3) show that the 
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Table 3: price correlation matrix (level) 
 
             WTI           Brent         OPEC         Iran        Venezuela         Saudi         Nigeria        EERD 
 
WTI                 1 
Brent              0.99             1 
OPEC            0.99           0.99             1 
Iran                0.99           0.99          0.99             1 
Venezuela      0.98           0.98          0.98            0.99                1 
Saudi Arab    0.98           0.99           0.99            0.99            0.99                1 
Nigeria         -0.98           0.99           0.99            0.99            0.99             0.99               1 
EERD            0.83          -0.82          -0.83           -0.82          -0.83             -0.81          -0.82            1 
   
 
     
Table 4: comparison of the series in level and in FD with the Variance Inflation Factor VIF 
         WTI          Brent           OPEC         Iran          Venezuela           Saudi         Nigeria 
2
i R  (Level)         0.992           0.993            0.990         0.989             0.981               0.994            0.994 
2
i R  ()             0.098            0.149            0.055         0.016             0.015               0.069            0.167 
VIF (Level)        125              142                100               91                53                  166                166 
VIF ()           1.08              1.17               1.05            1.02              1.01                1.07               1.2 
 
VIF= is the Variance inflation factor = 1/1-
2
t R  
 
 
In  order  to  examine  this  problem,  we  use  the  variance  inflation  factor  to  detect  the 
presence of multi co-linearity amongst series. Table 4 establishes comparison between 
the series in level and in first difference; we note that VIF statistics are relatively low 
with the first difference (less than 2). This suggests that multi co-linearity, if it’s present, 
is very weak and does not seem to induce serious risks. Therefore, we consider first order 
differencing of series, denoted, ( t P  ) and defined by 1 ln ln     t t t P P P  for each country. 
 
For  this  reason,  we  use  the  OLS  estimator  to  estimate  the  Eq.  (2).  The  estimated 
exchange rate mark-up elasticities are almost statistically significant and carry negative 
signs  while  the  export  price  reaction  elasticities  to  rivals’  prices  are  statistically 
significant and carry positive signs (reactions are strategic complements). As can be seen 
from table 5, the export price mark-up elasticity estimates vary between -0.011 and -
0.027  implying  a  partial  exchange  rate  pass  through.  For  a  10%  depreciation  of  the 
effective exchange rate of the US dollar during the sample period, for instance, export 
price in US dollar have been mark-up by 0.11-0.27% to partially recoup the decline in the 
international purchasing power of oil revenues. 
 
The estimated exchange rate export price mark-up elasticities illustrate a pattern as they 
are low for the small countries and high for the bigger nations. The results show a high 
value for Saudi Arabia (-0.027) and a small value for Nigeria (-0.011) which indicates the 
size of each exporting nations market. Thus, the high export price mark-up elasticity of 
Saudi Arabia indicates that it has a bigger size of oil market while Nigeria has a smaller 
size  of  oil  market  compared  to  OPEC  members.  The  answer  to  whether  or  not  the   6 
different  responses  are  the  result  of  the  difference  in  the  stock  reserve,  production 
capacity  utilization,  or  the  increased  cost  production  in  the  oil  industry  caused  by 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  cannot  be  inferred  from  our  results.  The  results,  however, 
provide an indication of the different reactions of OPEC members to an exogenous shock 




Table 5: the OLS estimation for OPEC Members  
                        Constant                 eerd              Saudi    iran               Venzla            Nigeria        Dummyt 
 
 Saudi                  0.019                -0.027               0.13              0.23             0.17        -0.09 
(P-value)            (0.12)                 (0.04)
*            (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*        (0.00)
* 
Iran                    0.020                 -0.026           0.20                               0.135           0.29        -0.08 
(P-value)           (0.20)                 (0.05)
*          (0.00)
*                                 (0.02)
*          (0.00)
*        (0.00)
* 
Venzla                0.015                 -0.022           0.35   0.132                                0.20               -0.15 
(P-value)           (0.31)                 (0.06)
**        (0.00)
*  (0.02)
*                              (0.00)
*        (0.00)
* 
Nigeria              0.016                 -0.011           0.28     0.31             0.22                             0.12 
(P-value)          (0.30)                  (0.06)
**        (0.00)
*             (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*          (0.00)
* 
       
* Results accepted at 5% significant level. ** Results accepted at 10% significant level. 




The  estimated  rival’s  prices  elasticities  carry  the  expected  positive  signs  and  are  all 
significant  at  the  5%  level.  The  results  showed  that  the  measure  of  the  rival  price 
elasticity estimates is as low as 0.13 for Saudi Arabia and as high 0.35 for Venezuela 
which indicates a substantial difference in the reactions of prices to the price changes of 
other members. We distinguish that the reaction of oil prices for Saudi Arabia to changes 
in the prices of others members are smaller others reactions of other members prices. 
However, we observe again that the Saudi Arabia has the biggest power/Pricing Strategy 
amongst member nations of OPEC. 
 
In support of this stylized fact, we consider that the substantial difference among the 
estimated rival price elasticities is an indication of the different market Power/Pricing 
strategy  of  member  nations  of  OPEC  in  respect  of  crude  prices  indexes  of  OPEC 
reference basket, WTI reference and Brent reference ( 1    for a small nation and the 
deviates  from  1  for  a  big  nation).  During  the  period  of  study,  table  6  suggests  that 
estimates  of  new  measures  of  rivals’  price  elasticities,  of  OPEC  members  related  in 
OPEC market, range from 0.049 to 0.061 ( opec  ). This result indicates that a substantial 
difference in the reactions of prices to the prices changes of other members. The low 
value for Saudi Arabia export price elasticities provides big size of market power, since 
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Table 6: the OLS estimation for WTI, Brent and OPEC references  
                            Constant           eerd              wti                Brent               opec                   Dummyt             
 
 Saudi                      0.027            -0.026          0.051          0.054           0.049                   0.02  
 (P-value)                (0.03)
*          (0.05)
*         (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*         (0.02)
*                (0.00)
* 
Iran                      0.020             -0.016          0.064          0.17            0.054                   0.08            
(P-value)           (0.10)
**          (0.09)
**        (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*        (0.02)
*                 (0.00)
*           
Venzla                   0.026             -0.013          0.033           0.12            0.058                   -0.06 
(P-value)            (0.11)             (0.07)
**         (0.00)
*          (0.00)
*        (0.03)
*                 (0.00)
* 
Nigeria               0.031            -0.001        0.021           0.045          0.061                  -0.03 
(P-value)          (0.07)
**            (0.02)
*         (0.03)
*          (0.02)
*       (0.03)
*                  (0.00)
* 
*  Results  are  accepted  at  5%  significative  levels.  **  Results  are  accepted  at  10  % 





We conclude that Saudi Arabia behaves as a price leader in the OPEC market structure. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has a bigger market power and perfectly competitive market 
structure in respect of the OPEC price reference. This result appears as a logical fact 
considering the geopolitical reality of all nations, relative to production and oil export 
scale. To inspect the robustness of the price behavior of OPEC members, we employ 
alternative measures of crude oil reference price indexes from different regions of the 
world oil market. 
 
Table 6 illustrate the fact that when Saudi Arabia’s export price is linked to another price 
references (as WTI and Brent), as a result, a significant but very weak relationship was 
obtained for rival price elasticities, which also differs from that of OPEC reference. This 
means that Saudi Arabia’s rival-price elasticities vary from one market to another (0.049, 
0.051 and 0.054 respectively for OPEC, WTI and Brent price references). Given its rival 
price  elasticities  estimates  convergence  for  each  market  reference,  Saudi  Arabia  is 
considered  to  be  more  disciplined  and  more  moderate  in  its  reactions  to  changes  in 
exchange  rates,  when  compared  to  other  OPEC  members.  Furthermore,  we  note  that 
Iran’s statistical  elasticity  estimates in  respect  of  WTI and  Brent references  are high 




In this paper we analysed the role of US exchange rate on oil price formation in the short 
run, and reached a main conclusion: 
 
The  paper  showed  that  the  volatility  of  exchange  rates  influences  directly  daily  oil 
exports  prices.  We  analysed  the  price  reactions  of  the  selected  OPEC  members  to 
responses  on  exchange  rates  changes  and  the  price  changes  of  other  members. 
Specifically, our empirical results suggest that, in response to change in exchange rates, 
exporters adjust their prices to achieve three main interrelated objectives: a) To secure a 
stable international purchasing power of oil revenues. b) To avoid suppressing market   8 
demand and losing market share. c) To geopolitical reasons. Therefore, each member of 
OPEC is trying to exercise some degree of market power in setting its export prices. 
 
According to our results, Saudi Arabia seems to behave quite differently in setting its 
prices compared to others members of OPEC, who set their own prices without being 
considerably influenced by other members’ prices. Thus Saudi Arabia behaves as a price 
leader in the OPEC structure market, while behaving differently when linked to other 
reference market. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia proved to be more disciplined and more 
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